Two settings are typically considered for secure multiparty computation, depending on whether or not a majority of the parties are assumed to be honest. Protocols designed under this assumption provide "full security" (and, in particular, guarantee output delivery and fairness) when this assumption is correct; however, if half or more of the parties are dishonest then security is completely compromised. On the other hand, protocols tolerating arbitrarily-many faults do not provide fairness or guaranteed output delivery even if only a single party is dishonest. It is natural to wonder whether it is possible to achieve the "best of both worlds": namely, a single protocol that simultaneously achieves the best possible security in both the above settings. Ishai, et al. (Crypto 2006) recently addressed this question, and ruled out constant-round protocols of this type.
INTRODUCTION
Protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC) [27, 16, 4, 7] allow a set of parties to compute an arbitrary function of their inputs while preserving (to the extent possible) the privacy of the parties' inputs as well as the (global) correctness of their outputs. Formally, security of such protocols is defined by requiring that a real execution of a protocol be indistinguishable from an ideal execution in which the parties hand their inputs to a trusted party who computes the function and returns the outputs to the appropriate parties. Thus, whatever security is implied by the ideal model must also be guaranteed in a real-world execution of the protocol.
Existing work on secure MPC, for the most part, can be divided neatly into the study of two, very different settings: the case when the malicious players are in the minority, and the case when an arbitrary number of parties may be malicious. These settings differ not only in the approaches used to construct secure protocols, but also in the results that can be achieved. In further detail (here and in the rest of the paper, we assume the existence of a broadcast channel or a trusted preprocessing phase sufficient for implementing broadcast):
• If there is an honest majority, then MPC protocols achieving so-called full security [15] are possible [4, 7, 25, 1] . Roughly speaking, "fully-secure" protocols guarantee not only privacy and correctness but also fairness (i.e., if one party receives its output then all parties do) and output delivery (i.e., honest parties receive their outputs).
• If half or more of the players are malicious (with the 2-party setting as a special case), then it is impossible [8] to construct protocols achieving full security in the sense described above. Specifically, while privacy and correctness are still attainable, it is impossible (in general) to guarantee fairness or output delivery. The relaxed notion of security that can be obtained in this setting is sometimes called security with abort [15] , and protocols realizing this notion for any number of corrupted parties [27, 16, 2, 17, 18] are known, assuming the existence of enhanced trapdoor permutations.
An unfortunate drawback of existing protocols for each of the above settings is that they do not provide any security beyond what is implied by the definitions. Specifically, protocols designed for the case of honest majority are completely insecure once half (or more) of the parties are corrupted: e.g., honest parties' inputs are entirely revealed, and even correctness may be violated. On the other hand, protocols that achieve security with abort against an arbitrary number of corruptions do not guarantee fairness or output delivery even if only a single party is corrupted.
To get a sense for the magnitude and importance of the problem, consider trying to decide which type of protocol is more appropriate for implementing secure voting. Since we would like privacy of individuals' votes to hold regardless of the number of corruptions, we are forced to use a protocol of the second type that provides only security with abort. But then a single corrupted machine (in fact, even one which simply fails in the middle of the election) can perform a denial-of-service attack that prevents all honest parties from learning the outcome. Neither option is very appealing. 
In light of the above, a natural question is:
To what extent can we design a single protocol achieving the "best of both worlds" regardless of the number of corruptions; i.e., a protocol that simultaneously guarantees full security in case a majority of the parties are honest, and security with abort otherwise?
The current lack of an answer to the above question represents a serious gap in our understanding of stand-alone secure computation, and is one of the few remaining open questions regarding feasibility (rather than efficiency) in this domain.
Ishai, et al. [19] recently addressed the above question, and showed a number of positive and negative results. Most relevant here is their result ruling out constant-round protocols achieving the best of both worlds in the sense described above. (They also show the impossibility of realizing reactive functionalities in any number of rounds. In this work, we consider non-reactive functionalities only.) Their work left open the possibility that protocols with polynomiallymany rounds (using, e.g., some variant of the ideas of [22, 2, 9, 17] ) might still give a positive answer to the above question.
Our Results
As our main contribution, we settle the above question by showing that there exist functionalities for which no protocol using polynomially-many rounds (even in expectation) can achieve the best of both worlds. Actually, our result is even stronger: we show a functionality for which any protocol that is fully-secure for a minority of fail-stop adversaries cannot even achieve privacy 2 in the presence of a fail-stop adversary corrupting half or more of the players. Our result generalizes to show that any protocol with full security when t parties (out of a total of n parties) are corrupted will not guarantee privacy when n − t parties are corrupted; "corrupted" can be taken to mean "fail-stop" in each case. We remark also that our results apply even if a common reference string is available.
This negative result is unfortunate, as it leaves protocol designers in a state of uncertainty about which type of security to aim for in a scenario when it is unclear what to assume about the number of corrupted players. (Think again of the voting example mentioned earlier.) An important question thus becomes:
What weaker (yet meaningful) security guarantees can be achieved for our problem?
Ishai, et al. [19] have already explored various answers to this question (recall that n denotes the total number of parties taking part in the protocol):
1. For any t, s with t + s < n and t < n/2, they show that a variant of a standard MPC protocol achieves full security for t malicious parties, and security with abort for s malicious parties.
2. They also construct a protocol that guarantees full security against either (1) t < n/2 malicious parties or (2) any number of semi-honest (i.e., honest-butcurious) parties. 3. A variant of the above protocol achieves full security in the presence of a malicious minority; furthermore, the actions of any s < n malicious players can be simulated by an ideal-world adversary who is allowed to invoke the functionality s times. For certain functionalitieswith voting as a prime example -this latter notion implies privacy and correctness (but not independence of inputs).
Here, we explore a different relaxation: we ask what can be attained if simultaneous message transmission is assumed. This is equivalent to considering a non-rushing adversary, and indeed our impossibility result mentioned earlier holds only for the case of a rushing adversary. From a theoretical point of view it is quite natural to consider simultaneous message transmission since other, similar impossibility results (e.g., the impossibility of fair coin tossing without an honest majority [8] ) can be overcome in this model. On the other hand, as we will see, this assumption does not trivialize things, either. Finally, simultaneous message transmission can be obtained (at least heuristically) by relying on timed commitments [5] . Other physical settings may also exist where it is reasonable to assume that simultaneous message transmission can be achieved.
In the simultaneous-message model, we show additional negative and positive results. On the negative side, we show that obtaining the "best of both worlds" is still impossible for logarithmic-round protocols. This improves on the work of Ishai, et al. [19] whose impossibility result for constant-round protocols, mentioned earlier, holds even for non-rushing adversaries. On the positive side, we show that for any polynomial p it is possible to construct a protocol (with polynomial round complexity depending on p) that is fully secure against a malicious minority and also "O(1/p)-secure with abort" for any number of malicious adversaries. Roughly speaking, this latter notion means that the actions of any ppt adversary in the real world can be simulated by a ppt adversary in the ideal world such that the distributions of the resulting outcomes cannot be distinguished with probability better than O(1/p). (The protocol provides additional security guarantees as well; see Section 5 for further discussion.)
Future Directions
Our work resolves the main question in this area, in that it demonstrates the impossibility of attaining the "best of both worlds" as originally hoped. Nevertheless, it is important to determine what can be achieved, and the following are the most compelling questions left open by our work:
• Do there exist protocols with super-logarithmic round complexity that attain the "best of both worlds" in the simultaneous-message model?
• Recall that our positive result obtains full security against a malicious minority and O(1/p)-security with abort for arbitrarily-many malicious parties. Is it possible to achieve this without assuming simultaneous message transmission? In either setting, is it possible to achieve O(1/p) full security for any number of corrupted parties?
The answers may be different for general functionalities and finite functionalities (i.e., functions whose domain and range do not grow with the security parameter). 4 In any case, it is clear that more work is needed.
Comparison to Related Work
We briefly discuss some work that is related to our own, stressing the differences between the goals being considered as well as the results that are achieved.
MPC with varying thresholds. Other works [11, 12, 13] have also studied protocols with different security guarantees depending on the number of corrupted parties. Although the motivation is related, we differ in particular from these works in that they always assume an honest majority.
Fair MPC. Our results neither imply, nor are they implied by, existing results ruling out fairness in the case of no honest majority [8] . Our positive result in the simultaneousmessage model is related to existing work aimed at achieving various partial notions of fairness [22, 2, 9, 17] ; however, to the best of our knowledge none of the prior work in this direction has suggested a simulation-based definition of exactly what sort of fairness is achieved (see [15, Section 7.7 .1] for a comment to this effect), nor do existing techniques appear to satisfy the definition of O(1/p)-security we use here.
Related to the above is work on gradual release [10, 5, 24, 14] that, informally, guarantees the following: if the adversary aborts early, then both the adversary and the honest players can obtain their outputs by investing a "similar" amount of work. The exact relation between this prior work and our own is unclear, however we note that this prior work deviates from standard notions of protocol design in that there is no a priori polynomial bound on the running 4 Both impossibility results in this paper apply even to finite functionalities. time of honest parties. In this work, in contrast, we assume the traditional requirement that the running time of honest parties is bounded (at least in expectation) by some fixed polynomial in the security parameter.
SECURITY DEFINITIONS
We use the standard definitions of security for multiparty computation; see, e.g., [15] . For convenience, we provide a brief review of these definitions here. We also define the less-standard notion of privacy, following [19] .
Computational indistinguishability.
A distribution ensemble X = {X(k, a)} k∈AE,a∈{0,1} * is an infinite sequence of probability distributions indexed by k and a. Two distribution ensembles X, Y are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c ≡ Y , if there exists a negligible function ε such that for every polynomial-time algorithm D and all a the quantity
The real model. We assume the standard communication model where n parties communicate in synchronous rounds using pairwise private and authenticated channels. We also assume that these parties have access to a broadcast channel; since a broadcast channel can be realized using a PKI and digital signatures for any number of corrupted parties, this assumption is inessential to our results. We will consider both rushing adversaries (who may delay sending messages on behalf of corrupted parties in a given round until the messages sent by all honest parties in that round have been received) as well as non-rushing adversaries (who must decide on what messages to send in a given round independent of the messages sent by honest parties in that same round). For simplicity, we assume a static adversary who may only corrupt parties in advance of the protocol execution; this strengthens our negative results and seems inessential for our positive result. Malicious adversarial parties may deviate in an arbitrary manner from the protocol specification, while semi-honest adversaries are assumed to follow the protocol faithfully. Fail-stop adversaries are assumed to follow the protocol as specified except that they may abort (and refuse to send any more messages) at any time, depending on their view.
At the beginning of a real execution of a protocol, each party Pi holds the security parameter 1 k and its input xi. We let f denote a poly-time computable, randomized function that maps players' inputs x def = (x1, . . . , xn) to a vector of outputs (y1, . . . , yn), where yi denotes the output intended for Pi. We deal only with standard, non-reactive functionalities here.
The adversary A takes as input 1 k , the set I ⊂ [n] of corrupted parties, the inputs of the corrupted parties, and an auxiliary input z. The interaction of A with a protocol π defines a random variable realπ,A,I (k, x, z) whose value is determined by the coin tosses of the adversary and the honest players. This random variable contains the output of the adversary (which may be an arbitrary function of its view) as well as the outputs of the uncorrupted parties. We let realπ,A,I denote the distribution ensemble
The ideal model -full security. Here the parties interact with a trusted party implementing f . Each honest party Pi holds an input xi as before; the adversary A is again given 1 k , the set I of corrupted parties, the inputs of all the corrupted parties, and an auxiliary input z. Each honest party Pi sets x i = xi and sends x i to the trusted party; each corrupted party Pj sends an arbitrary input x j to the trusted party as directed by A . In case some corrupted party Pj does not send an input, x j is set to a default value. The trusted party computes (y1, . . . , yn) ← f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), choosing a uniformly random tape for f in case it is randomized, and sends yi to party Pi.
The interaction of A with the trusted party defines a random variable ideal f,A ,I (k, x, z) whose value is determined by the random coins of the adversary and those used by the trusted party in evaluating f . This random variable contains the output of A (which may again be an arbitrary function of its view) and the outputs of the uncorrupted parties. We let ideal f,A ,I denote the distribution ensem-
The ideal model -security with abort. 5 As in the previous case, parties again interact with a trusted party implementing f . Parties send inputs x 1 , . . . , x n to this trusted party, who then computes (y1, . . . , yn) ← f (x 1 , . . . , x n ) as before. Now, however, output delivery occurs in two phases. First, the trusted party sends to A the outputs {yi}i∈I . The adversary can then decide whether to abort the trusted party, or whether to allow it to continue. In the former case, the trusted party sends the special symbol ⊥ to all honest parties as their output, where ⊥ is assumed not to lie in the range of f . In the latter case, the trusted party sends the correct output yi to each honest party Pi.
The interaction of A with the trusted party defines a random variable ideal f ⊥ ,A ,I (k, x, z) as in the previous case, and we let ideal f ⊥ ,A ,I denote the distribution ensemblë
The subscript "⊥" indicates that the adversary can abort computation of f .) Security definitions. We may now define what it means for a protocol to be secure.
Definition 1
Let f be an n-party randomized functionality, and π be an n-party protocol. Then π t-securely computes f if for any ppt adversary A there exists a ppt adversary A such that for any I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ t:
Similarly, π t-securely computes f with abort if for any ppt adversary A there exists a ppt adversary A such that for any I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ t:
As in [19] , we define also a notion of privacy against malicious adversaries. Informally, privacy means that an adversary does not learn anything about the inputs of the honest parties that is not implied by its own inputs and outputs. Let outA (realπ,A,I (k, x, z)) denote the output of the adversary A in the indicated random variable, and let 5 Alternative approaches to defining the ideal model in this case exist [18] , though the differences are unimportant for our work once we assume a broadcast channel. A ,I (k, x, z) ) correspondingly denote the output of A . We denote by outπ,A,I (resp., out f,A ,I ) the corresponding distribution ensembles in the natural way. (We remark that since we only consider the output of A in the second case, it does not matter whether we are in the ideal world allowing abort or not.) Definition 2 Let f be an n-party randomized functionality, and π be an n-party protocol. Then π t-privately computes f in the presence of malicious adversaries if for any ppt adversary A there exists a ppt adversary A such that for any I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ t:
Note that if π t-securely computes f with abort then this implies that π t-privately computes f .
We stress that considering privacy alone yields a relatively weak notion of security which has many shortcomings (see discussion in [19] ); however, we use it only insofar as we prove impossibility of attaining it.
MAIN IMPOSSIBILITY RESULT
We now show our main result, which rules out any protocol achieving the "best of both worlds": Theorem 1. Let n, t, s be such that t + s = n and t ≥ 1.
Then there exists a finite, deterministic functionality f for which there is no polynomial-round protocol π that simultaneously t-securely computes f (for rushing adversaries) and s-privately computes f in the presence of malicious, rushing adversaries. This holds even if we consider only fail-stop adversaries in each case.
The theorem is tight: as discussed in the full version of [19] (obtained from the authors), if t + s < n and t < n/2 then for any poly-time functionality f there exists (under standard cryptographic assumptions) a protocol π that tsecurely computes f and s-securely computes f with abort. Note also that the theorem is only interesting when t < n/2, otherwise we already know that there exist functionalities that cannot be t-securely computed (i.e., without allowing abort).
We prove the theorem in two steps: we first present a finite, deterministic functionality f for which any protocol π that t-securely computes f does not s-securely compute f with abort. Extending this counterexample, we then give a (slightly different) functionality f and show that any protocol π that t-securely computes f does not even s-privately compute f .
Ruling out Security with Abort
Fix n, s, and 1 ≤ t < n/2 as in the theorem (as mentioned, the theorem is already known to hold if t ≥ n/2). Define f as follows: players P1 and Pn each provide a bit b1 and bn, respectively, as input, and each receive as output b1 ⊕ bn (no other players receive output). Let π be any protocol that t-securely computes f for fail-stop adversaries. We assume that π operates in a fixed number of segments, each exactly n rounds long, where party Pi, and this party only, sends a message in the i th round of a segment (i.e., in a given segment first P1 speaks, then P2, etc. until Pn speaks and then the next segment begins). If π is secure against a rushing adversary, then it can always be transformed, albeit by increasing the round complexity, so that it has this form. (We remark also that the assumption that only one party speaks in any given round is not essential for our proof, but merely serves to simplify things conceptually.) Let r = r(k) denote the number of segments of the protocol. We assume that if π is run (honestly) to completion, then the outputs of P1 and Pn are correct (and, in particular, agree) with probability 6 at least 7/8. Consider the following sum (those who find the compressed notation resulting from the two-column format difficult to read are advised to consult [20] ):
It is possible to show [20] that the above sum is lowerbounded by 1/4; thus, at least one of the 4r(k) + 2 terms in the sum is lower-bounded by p(k)
, which is noticeable. We show that this implies that π does not 6 Security (or even just correctness) of π actually implies that this holds with all but negligible probability. However, we will make use of the relaxed requirement stated here in Section 3.3.
s-securely compute f with abort, even for fail-stop adversaries.
Case 1(a). Say
and consider the adversary who corrupts players in A∪B and does the following: it chooses input for P1 as well as random tapes for all players in A and B uniformly at random, and then computes v Note that |A ∪ B| = s. The probability that Pn outputs 1 in a real execution of the protocol is exactly
However, in an ideal execution with any adversary corrupting players in A ∪ B, the honest player Pn will not output 1 with probability greater than 1 2 (given that its input is chosen uniformly at random).
7 It follows that π does not s-securely compute f with abort.
Case 1(b). Say
Pr[v 0 1 = 0 v 0 n = 0] + Pr[v 0 1 = 1 v r n = 0] − 1 2 ≥ p(k).
An argument as above gives an adversary who corrupts parties in A ∪ B and forces
Pn to output 0 with probability noticeably greater than 1/2. This again implies that π does not s-securely compute f with abort.
Case 2(a). Say there exists an i ∈ {0, . . . , r(k) − 1} for which
Consider the adversary given auxiliary input z = i who corrupts the players in A and B and acts as follows: it chooses random input for P1 and then runs the protocol honestly up to the end of segment i (if i = 0, this is the beginning of the protocol). At this point, the players in A ∪ B jointly have enough information to compute v then the parties in A send their (honestly-computed) messages for segment i + 1 but send no more messages after that (i.e., they abort in segment i + 2). In either case, parties in B continue to run the entire rest of the protocol honestly. Now, the probability that Pn outputs 0 in a real execution of the protocol is exactly
However, in an ideal execution with any adversary corrupting players in A ∪ B, the honest player Pn will not output 0 with probability greater than 1 2 given that its input is chosen uniformly at random. Thus, π does not s-securely compute f with abort.
Case 2(b). If there exists an i such that
an argument as above gives an adversary corrupting players in A ∪ B who forces Pn to output 1 more often than can be achieved by any ideal-world adversary. The probability that P1 outputs 0 in a real execution of the protocol is exactly
Case 3(a)
However, in an ideal execution with any adversary corrupting players in B ∪ C, the honest player P1 will not output 0 with probability greater than 1 2 given that its input is chosen uniformly at random. We conclude that π does not s-securely compute f with abort.
Case 3(b). If there exists an i such that
an argument as above gives an adversary corrupting players in B ∪ C who forces P1 to output 1 more often than can be achieved by any ideal-world adversary.
The observant reader will note that the argument above is very similar to that given by Cleve [8] in showing the impossibility of fair coin tossing without honest majority. A key difference is that in Cleve's setting honest parties are required to output a bit no matter what (in particular, no matter how many other parties abort); in our setting, if half or more of the parties abort then honest parties can simply output ⊥. This introduces additional technical complications in the argument.
Ruling out Privacy
The argument in the previous section shows that we cannot hope to achieve the best of both worlds. However, we might hope to obtain a t-secure protocol π that at least achieves s-privacy (in the presence of malicious adversaries). By building on the result of the previous section we rule out this possibility as well.
Given n, t, s as before, we define a function f that takes inputs from P1 and Pn, and returns output to P1, Pn, and also (here we differ from before) Pt+1. On input (b1, α0, α1) from P1 and (bn, β0, β1) from Pn, where b1, bn, α0, α1, β0, β1 ∈ {0, 1}, functionality f computes v = b1 ⊕ bn, gives v to P1 and Pn, and gives (v, αv, βv) to Pt+1. That is:
f ((b1, α0, α1), λ, . . . , λ, (bn, β0, β1) 
where λ denotes an empty input/output.
Let π be a protocol that t-securely computes f . Let A, B, C be a partition of the players as in the previous section, and recall that Pt+1 ∈ B. Consider an experiment in which P1 and Pn choose their inputs uniformly at random and all parties run protocol π honestly, except that players in A or C may possibly abort. An argument exactly as in the previous section shows that there exists a real-world adversary A who either
• corrupts the parties in A ∪ B and causes Pn to output some bit v with probability noticeably greater than 1/2; or
• corrupts the parties in B ∪ C and causes P1 to output some bit v with probability noticeably greater than 1/2.
Assume without loss of generality that the first case holds, and there is an adversary A who corrupts players in A ∪ B and causes Pn to output 0 with probability at least 1/2+p(k) for some noticeable function p. The key observation is that A only causes the t players in A to abort, and the remaining corrupted players in B act entirely honestly. Since π is fully-secure for up to t malicious players, all players in B ∪C should receive their outputs (except possibly with negligible probability) even if all players in A abort. Moreover, tsecurity of π implies that the output of the honest-looking Pt+1 should be consistent with the input and output of Pn (except with negligible probability). Taken together, this means that the view of A -which includes the output honestly generated by Pt+1 -includes β0 with probability at least 1/2+p (k) for some noticeable function p , and furthermore A knows when this occurs (since the output of Pt+1 includes v def = b1 ⊕ bn in addition to βv). Thus, A can output a guess for β0 which is correct with probability at least
In contrast, no ideal-world adversary A corrupting A ∪ B can output a guess for β0 which is correct with probability better than 3/4 when Pn chooses its inputs uniformly at random. This shows that π does not s-privately compute f .
Protocols Using an Expected Polynomial Number of Rounds
A simple extension of the arguments given above applies to protocols having expected polynomial round complexity. We sketch the main idea here, with respect to the proof given in Section 3.1. Say we have a protocol π that t-securely computes f and for which the expected number of segments in π is p(k). Security (or even just correctness) of π implies that if π is run honestly to completion, then the outputs of P1 and Pn are correct (and, in particular, agree) with all but negligible probability. Setting r(k) = 8 · r (k), this means that except with probability negligibly close to 1/8 the outputs of P1 and Pn are correct and are computed by the end of segment r(k).
The remainder of the proof is as before.
A LOWER BOUND FOR NON-RUSHING ADVERSARIES
The stark impossibility result of the preceding section forces us to examine relaxations of our original goal. Here we consider the case of non-rushing adversaries or, equivalently, the case when simultaneous message transmission is available. This setting is natural to consider since, for example, fair coin flipping is impossible for rushing adversaries [8] but trivial to achieve for non-rushing adversaries; one might hope for something similar here. Moreover, as noted earlier, it appears that simultaneous message transmission can be implemented under plausible cryptographic assumptions.
Unfortunately, eliminating rushing does not seem to make the problem significantly easier; we show that no logarithmicround protocol can achieve the best of both worlds even in this setting.
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Theorem 2. Let n, t, s be such that t + s = n and t ≥ 1.
Then there exists a finite n-party functionality f for which there is no protocol π whose round complexity is logarithmic in the security parameter and such that π simultaneously t-securely computes f (for non-rushing adversaries) and s-privately computes f in the presence of malicious, non-rushing adversaries. This holds even if we consider only fail-stop adversaries in each case.
For simplicity, we look at the case n = 3, t = 1, s = 2 (the argument generalizes in a straightforward manner). As in [19] , we consider three parties A, B, C computing the following functionality f : both A and C provide inputs a, c ∈ {1, 2, 3}; party B is given the output
where λ denotes an empty input and denotes a distinguished output that does not lie in {1, 2, 3}. Let π be a protocol that 1-securely computes f , and let r(k) = O(log k) be the number of rounds in π. In contrast to the previous section, here we allow for all parties to send messages in a single round. Consider the experiment in which A and C each choose their inputs a, c uniformly at random, and all parties run π honestly except that A or C may possibly abort the protocol early. Define Ai to be the output that B generates if the last message sent by C was in round i (and A, B continue to run the protocol honestly until the end), with A0 denoting the output of B in case C never sends any messages. Similarly, define Ci to be the output that B generates if the last message sent by A was in round i (and B, C continue to run the protocol honestly until the end). Note that if an adversary controls both A and B, then Ai can be computed immediately after C sends its round-i message. (And analogously for Ci.) Also, with all but negligible probability we have Ai ∈ {a, } and Ci ∈ {c, } since π is fully secure when only one party aborts, and thus the output of the (honest-looking) B must be consistent with the input of the remaining honest party. For convenience, we simply assume that this occurs with probability 1.
Define Sumi for odd i ∈ {1, . . . , r} as follows:
Sumi for even i ∈ {1, . . . , r} is defined analogously by interchanging the roles of A and C:
Define also Xi = By induction, it follows that for any j ≤ i we have
and so in particular
for ε approaching 0 as k grows large. The second equality uses the facts that C0 is independent of a, and a, c are chosen uniformly in {1, 2, 3}. The final inequality is by the 1-security of π (since if Pr[C0 = c] > 1 3 then an adversary corrupting A who aborts immediately causes the honest player B to output c with probability greater than 1/3, something that cannot occur in the ideal world).
Since r = r(k) is logarithmic in k, Eq. (1) . Since a = c with probability 1/3 and Ar = Cr = a = c with all but negligible probability when this occurs (this follows from correctness of π), the former cannot be the case. As in Section 3.1, we show that the latter contradicts security of π. Without loss of generality, assume Sumi ≥ (recall that Ci−1 ∈ {c, }) and is incorrect with probability Pr[Ai = a Î a = c]. Thus, its bias in guessing c (i.e., the probability that it guesses correctly minus the probability that it guesses incorrectly) is noticeably better than 1/3. Yet in the ideal model, no adversary corrupting A and B can guess c with bias better than 1/3 when C's input is chosen uniformly at random: the best strategy is to send an arbitrary input a to the trusted party computing f , output a if the trusted party returns a as output, and output a random guess otherwise (or simply output "don't know" in this case). It is easy to turn this observation into a method for distinguishing, with noticeable probability, between the output of A (in the real world) and the output of any idealworld adversary. 9 We conclude that π does not 2-privately compute f in the presence of malicious adversaries. − 1/poly(k). Then consider the adversary who corrupts A, chooses input a at random, and runs honestly until round i− 1 at which point it aborts. Then the output of the honest party B is equal to C's input c with probability noticeably different from 1/3. But no adversary corrupting A in the ideal world (without abort) can cause B to output c with probability different from 1/3 when c is chosen uniformly at random. Thus, this possibility cannot occur since it would contradict the assumption that π 1-securely computes f . 
A POSITIVE RESULT
The previous section shows that even if we allow simultaneous message transmission, positive results will be hard to come by (at least in the sense that the round complexity for any protocol achieving the "best of both worlds" must be super-logarithmic). In fact, we conjecture (though, obviously, have not yet been able to prove) that even protocols with polynomially-many rounds cannot achieve the best of both worlds in that setting, and so some additional relaxation is needed.
Here, we show a positive result for our problem: for any p, we show a protocol with round complexity O(pn 2 ) which is (1) fully secure in the presence of an honest majority, even for the case of a rushing adversary and (2) can be simulated to within O(1/p) (in a sense we will soon precisely define) in the presence of arbitrarily-many malicious (but non-rushing) parties. The protocol is also fully-secure for any number of semi-honest parties; see further discussion below.
We now define the notion to which we have informally referred above. Say two distribution ensembles X, Y are indistinguishable to within δ, denoted X δ ≈ Y , if there exists a negligible function ε such that for every ppt algorithm D and all a the quantity
If f is an n-party functionality and π is an n-party protocol, then π t-securely computes f with abort to within δ if for any ppt adversary A there exists a ppt adversary A such that for any I ⊂ [n] with |I| ≤ t we have realπ,A,I δ ≈ ideal f,A ,I . (We could define a similar notion for the case of full security but we will not need it.) The main result of this section is the following:
Under suitable cryptographic assumptions (inherited from [21, 23] ), for any n, any t < n/2, any s < n, any n-party poly-time functionality f , and any polynomial p, there exists an O(pt 2 )-round protocol that:
• t-securely computes f (for rushing adversaries)
• s-securely computes f with abort to within O(1/p) (for non-rushing adversaries).
• s-securely computes f for semi-honest adversaries.
Our protocol does not weaken the security obtained when fewer than half the parties are corrupted (namely, we achieve the standard notion of security in that setting, even for rushing adversaries); thus, the protocol is an improvement over "standard" protocols achieving security for honest majority in that at least not all is lost if half or more of the parties are corrupted. Furthermore, our protocol is a strict improvement of the main positive result from [19] since we also achieve (full) security against an arbitrary number of semihonest adversaries. Though not explicitly mentioned in the theorem, our protocol is also a strict improvement of the second positive result from [19] since our protocol has the property that the view of a malicious adversary corrupting any s < n parties can be simulated by an ideal-world adversary that is allowed to invoke the functionality s + 1 times (this holds even when rushing is allowed). We now present the details. Fix n, and let f be a polytime n-party functionality. We assume for ease of presentation that f is a single-output functionality; this is without loss of generality since protocols computing such functionalities can be used in the standard way to compute functionalities where each party gets a possibly different output. We also fix t = (n − 1)/2 , though reducing the number of rounds (as claimed) for smaller values of t is straightforward.
Assume that the output of f can be viewed as lying in some field which also contains [n]. (Actually, if the output of f is v bits long we need a field which can represent strings of length at least v + 1.) Let h = n/2 + 1. For a polynomial p given as a parameter, define the following randomized functionality F for a subset of parties H ⊆ [n] holding inputs {xi}i∈H : When we refer to "secret sharing," we always intend the classical scheme by Shamir [26] . We also require implicitly that the shares given to the parties are authenticated, e.g., by being signed with respect to a public key generated by F and given to all parties. • If the above does no occur, and some player cheats in round i (and so i = 1 or s i−1 = 0), remove all parties who were caught cheating from H. If |H| < h then output ⊥ and terminate the protocol. Otherwise, return to phase 1.
Using [21, 23] , there exists a constant-round protocol πF with the necessary security properties. Thus, the worst-case round complexity of the above protocol is pn · (n − 1)/2 = O(pn 2 ). A sketch of the claimed security properties for the above protocol can be found in [20] .
